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Abstract 
We seek to constitute the extended mind’s fourth wave, socially 
distributed group cognition, and we do so by thinking with 
Hegel. The extended mind theory’s first wave invokes the 
parity principle, which maintains that processes that occur 
external to the organism’s skin should be considered mental if 
they are regarded as mental when they occur inside the 
organism. The second wave appeals to the complementarity 
principle, which claims that what is crucial is that these 
processes together constitute a cognitive system. The first two 
waves assume that cognitive systems have well-defined 
territories or boundaries, and that internal and external 
processes do not switch location. The third wave rejects these 
assumptions, holding instead that internal processes are not 
privileged, and internal and external processes can switch, and 
that processes can be distributed among individuals. The fourth 
wave would advocate socially distributed group cognition. 
Groups are deterritorialized collective agents; they are 
ineliminatively and irreducibly real, they have mental states. 
Individuals constitute groups, but groups also constitute 
individuals. What counts as an individual and a group is a 
function of the level of analysis. And they are conflicted. 
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To work now? Never, never: I’m on strike. 
Right now, I’m encrapulating myself as 
much as possible. Why? I want to be a poet, 
and I’m working to turn myself into a seer: 
you won’t understand at all, and it’s unlikely 
that I’ll be able to explain it to you. It has to 
do with making your way toward the 
unknown by a derangement of all the senses. 
The suffering is tremendous, but one must 
bear up against it, to be born a poet, and I 
know that’s what I am. It’s not at all my 
fault. It’s wrong to say I think: one should 
say I am thought. Forgive the pun. 
I is someone else. Tough luck to the wood 
that becomes a violin, and to hell with the 
unaware who quibble over what they’re 
completely missing anyway!i 
 
 
dversaries of the extended mind emphasize the 
importance of the “persisting individual” to cognitive 
science. They urge that this is incompatible with the extended 
mind’s transient couplings and hook-ups, linking individuals 
and aspects of their environments, thereby constituting 
cognitive systems. Yet, in the nineteenth century, Arthur 
Rimbaud recognized that individuals are constitutively 
conjoined to others, always already, who are themselves so 
conjoined, and that an individual’s persistence is that of a 
A 
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continuing process, not a substance. Metaphor: individuals 
are not trees, much less petrified wood, but rhizomes.ii 
Asparagus and ginger are rhizomes, Indian lotus too. With 
uncanny insight, Hindus not only portray Viṣṇu (the god of 
preservation) and Lakṣmī (the goddess of prosperity) on 
lotuses, they also depict the universe’s creation as a lotus 
emerging from Viṣṇu’s navel. Although not his main point, 
Rimbaud saw that a violin constitutively depends on its wood. 
And, his main point: I does not think; rather, I is thought’s 
result.  
 
In the “Preface” to the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 
Hegel cautions his readers to not expect philosophy to give 
advice about what should be done.iii This is so, he explains, 
because philosophy’s comprehension is always retrospective, 
discerning an era’s essential characteristics only after they 
have already fully developed. So, it might be anticipated that 
a project of thinking with Hegel about the extended mind 
could at most discern what others have already achieved—
articulating, clarifying, and making explicit—but that it 
would not advance the discussion. The extended mind would 
clarify Hegel’s concept of Geist (“spirit” or “mind”), and his 
concept of “right” (Recht roughly, social mores and law) 
serves as an exemplar of the extended mind.iv This could seem 
like a system of mirrors, mutually illuminating each other—
and impatient readers might wonder when the smoke will be 
introduced.  
 
Nevertheless, the project of making things explicit can be 
valuable, articulating and then synthesizing, thereby making 
way for further conceptual advance. Moreover, Hegelians 
have defended the extended mind from Mark Sprevak’s 
argument that the extended mind is overly permissive in its 
attributions of mental states, and that—since functionalism 
entails the extended mind—both should be rejected.v 
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Naturally, Hegelians worry, not that the extended mind is too 
liberal in its attributions of mental states, but rather that it is 
too conservative.  
 
We will discuss the extended mind’s first two waves, 
suggesting that they really constitute one wave, explain that 
the third wave is well under way, and show that the resources 
are in place for a fourth wave. We suggest that the fourth wave 
is conflicted, constituted, as it were, by various interfering 
waves. 
 
WAVES: 1-2-3-4 
 
Richard Menary punctuates the extended mind in two waves, 
John Sutton anticipates a third, which Michal David 
Kirchhoff develops.vi The first wave invokes the parity 
principle, articulated by Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, 
which maintains that processes that occur external to the 
organism’s skin should be considered cognitive if they are 
functionally equivalent to cognitive processes occurring 
inside the organism: “If, as we confront some task, a part of 
the world functions as a process which, were it done in the 
head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of 
the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we 
claim) part of the cognitive process. Cognitive processes ain’t 
(all) in the head!”vii  
 
The extended mind’s second wave appeals to the 
complementarity principle. Critics of the extended mind 
argue that external processes are substantially dissimilar from 
internal processes, and so they maintain that external 
processes are not cognitive.viii Menary suggests, in response, 
that the parity principle serves not so much as an argument for 
the extended mind as an intuition pump.ix He and Sutton claim 
that external and internal processes need not be similar, as the 
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parity principle requires; rather these external and internal 
processes must be complementary. What is crucial is that 
external and internal processes are functionally integrated 
together, such that they constitute a cognitive system.  
 
Indeed, Clark explains that the parity principle stresses the 
functional integration of cognitive processes, regardless of 
whether they are located externally or internally. The brain, 
body, and world are in an “equal-partners dance,” he writes, 
“with the nature of the mind fixed by the overall balance thus 
achieved: a kind of extended functionalism.”x This suggests, 
in turn, that the second wave is not a move beyond the first 
wave, but rather is its correct interpretation, and that the 
complementarity principle is the parity principle’s 
explication.  
 
Nevertheless, the parity and complementarity principles both 
assume that any specific cognitive system—variously 
referred to as a self, person, mind, individual, or agent—has a 
well-defined territory or boundary, as do the various external 
and internal processes that constitute it. Further, in Clark’s 
rendition of the extended mind, the organism is privileged 
over its environment. “In rejecting the vision of human 
cognitive processing as organism bound,” he urges, “we 
should not feel forced to deny that it is (in most, perhaps all, 
real-world cases), organism centered.” Clark explains: “Just 
as it is the spider’s body that spins and maintains the web that 
then ... constitutes part of its own extended phenotype, so it is 
the biological human organism that spins, selects, or 
maintains the webs of cognitive scaffolding that participate in 
the extended machinery of its own thought and reason. 
Individual cognizing, then, is organism centered even if it is 
not organism bound.”xi  
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The third wave seeks to move beyond this. It recognizes that 
cognitive systems are dissolved, Sutton writes, “into peculiar 
loci of coordination and coalescence among multiple 
structured media,” and so are deterritorialized. “Without 
assuming distinct inner and outer realms of engrams and 
exograms, the natural and the artificial, each with its own 
proprietary characteristics,” Sutton explains, “this third wave 
would analyze these boundaries as hard-won and fragile 
developmental and cultural achievements, always open to 
renegotiation.”xii Describing a “collective emergent agent” 
who would be constituted by individuals and their instruments 
in dynamic interaction with their environment, Eric Arnau et 
al. write that, “this—clearly counterintuitive—kind of 
‘deterritorialization’ of the cognitive agent is the move that 
Sutton envisages as a ‘third wave’ of cognitive externalism.” 
They immediately assure their readers that “of course, the 
individual agents will still be there; and we might want to 
explain what any of them is doing, cognitively speaking.”xiii  
 
Kirchhoff develops the third wave. Contrasting “the fixed-
properties view,” which holds that internal and external 
processes are distinct, and that they do not switch, he proposes 
an alternative “dynamic properties view.” According to this 
view, “the plastic brain gets enculturated through 
development in socio-cultural practices.” Moreover, the 
dynamic properties view “does not assume, when having to 
explain the integration/assembly of cognitive systems, that the 
individual organism is the most active element,” and so it 
“implies that the assembly of cognitive systems is the result 
of richly dynamical and distributed elements, where there is 
no collapse into individualism” of the fixed-properties 
view.xiv “Cognitive assembly and agency are best 
understood,” according to the extended mind’s third wave, “as 
self-organizational processes distributed across brains, 
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bodies, people, norms, and socio-cultural practices and 
structures—none of which have any analytical priority.”xv  
 
In addition, all of these—brains, bodies, people, norms, and 
socio-cultural practices and structures—dynamically interact 
and so enable alterations in one another. For example, the 
hippocampi of taxi drivers enlarge as a consequence of their 
navigating the streets of London.xvi So, the third wave holds 
that (1) which processes are external or internal is a 
consequence of social, historical, and cultural factors, that (2) 
external processes can become internal, and vice versa, such 
that (3) “diachronic development in stable and predictive 
patterns of socio-cultural practices sculpts the patterns of 
neural activity to the ones found at the socio-cultural 
level.”xvii  
 
The extended mind is a common occurrence, although it is 
frequently overlooked. Robert D. Rupert invites his readers to 
“take one instance of a writer’s use of her notes.” Readers will 
discover, he believes, that “the previous thoughts she recorded 
in those notes surely were her thoughts just prior to the time 
she wrote them; they were, apparently, not the thoughts of an 
extended system.”xviii Even if Rupert’s scenario can happen in 
one instance, it does not describe Ralph Waldo Emerson’s use 
of his journal, to which he frequently turned for inspiration; 
here, Emerson is constitutively coupled with his journal in a 
reciprocal causally interacting extended cognitive system.xix  
 
Writers, even philosophers, frequently experience the texts 
they are writing as taking on lives of their own, where the next 
sentences unexpectedly emerge. It is common to hear writers 
proclaim that they do not know what they are going to write 
until they write. In these cases, the thoughts are not the 
writers’ prior to being written. Rather, those thoughts are 
constituted through being written. Such writers discover what 
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they think as they read what they are writing. Co-authors learn 
what they think by reading what their collaborators wrote, and 
the collaborators, peradventure, when what they wrote is 
explained to them. When readers add their thoughts too, 
perhaps centuries later, the mind really gets extended and 
deterritorialized.  
 
Before discussing the fourth wave, it will be useful to present 
the taxonomy that J. Adam Carter et al. introduce.xx 
Internalism, in the philosophy of mind, urges that cognitive 
processes and mental states are located solely in an 
individual’s brain. Embodied cognition states that cognitive 
processes and mental states are located in an individual’s 
brain and body. Content externalism maintains that the 
content of mental states may constitutively depend, at least in 
part, on an individual’s physical or social environment.  
 
Carter et al. discern three forms of active externalism: 
extended cognition, the extended mind, and distributed 
cognition. Extended cognition holds that cognitive processes 
can extend to the artifacts in an individual’s environment. 
Agreeing with extended cognition that cognitive processes 
can so extend, the extended mind claims that mental states—
such as experiences, emotions, desires, and beliefs—can also 
extend to those artifacts. Also accepting extended cognition, 
distributed cognition adds that cognitive processes can be 
distributed among several individuals. Extended cognition 
and distributed cognition emphasize cognitive processes, 
while the extended mind focuses on mental states.  
 
Linking this taxonomy to the extended mind’s waves, what 
Carter et al. refer to as the extended mind correlates with its 
first and second waves, and what they refer to as distributed 
cognition correlates with its third wave. The fourth wave of 
the extended mind would maintain that there can be socially 
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distributed group cognition, where cognitive processes, as 
well as mental states, are distributed among multiple 
individuals and among groups.xxi  
 
This taxonomy may be supplemented by noting that extended 
cognition and the extended mind both extend processes which 
are initially unextended, and both distinguish external 
processes and internal processes. Distributed cognition, by 
contrast, does not presuppose that processes are initially 
unextended. It also argues that which cognitive processes are 
external, and which internal, is a consequence of socio-
cultural practices. External processes can become internal, 
moreover, and internal processes can become external.  
 
Further, the phenomenon of transactive memory shows that 
distributed cognition may involve mental states as well as 
cognitive processes.
xxiii
xxii Transactive memory occurs when 
persons collectively remember something. To give a simple 
example: a person remembers one item, leading another 
person to remember something else, which further prompts 
the memory of the first person. Transactive memory can occur 
among persons who know each other well, such as spouses or 
members of a research team. Specific persons may be 
assigned or relied on to remember certain sorts of things. 
Transactive memory can also occur among persons who have 
just met, such as subjects in a psychological experiment. 
Harris et al. present a case of a couple who transactively 
remembers the beginning of their relationship.  Here, the 
cognitive processes are distributed, but the couple now also 
shares the same mental states, the same remembrances.  
 
We seek to develop further the extended mind’s fourth wave. 
Cognitive systems are distributed among multiple persons, 
groups, which are deterritorialized collective agents. Groups 
are ineliminatively and irreducibly real. Moreover, they have 
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mental states. Individuals are still there, although where they 
are cannot be precisely specified. What any of them is doing, 
cognitively speaking, cannot be determined in isolation. 
Individuals constitute groups, but groups also constitute 
individuals. What counts as an individual and a group is a 
function of the level of analysis, as well as the practical 
interests that motivate this analysis. As a consequence, 
individuals can be regarded as groups, and groups as 
individuals. Comprehended thus, group agents are not so 
clearly counterintuitive. 
 
HOW THE HARNESS FITS 
 
One of the considerable achievements of Randall Collins’ 
sociology of philosophy is to demonstrate that every 
philosopher, with no known exception, thought with (and 
sometimes against) a group.xxiv Although interest in the 
“extended mind”—referred to as such—is recent, the minds 
of philosophers have always been extended. We contribute to 
constituting the extended mind’s fourth wave, with Hegel, 
articulating its lineaments.  
 
Ralph Waldo Emerson recommends that writers leave their 
readers unsatisfied and have them do some of the thinking: 
 
The most interesting writing is that which does 
not quite satisfy the reader. Try and leave a 
little thinking for him [sic]; that will be better 
for both. The trouble with most writers is, they 
spread too thin. The reader is as quick as they; 
has got there before, and is ready and waiting. 
A little guessing does him no harm, so I would 
assist him [sic] with no connections. If you can 
see how the harness fits, he [sic] can. But 
make sure that you see it.xxv 
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We are happy to follow these recommendations. They suit our 
style. Although readers may be initially dissatisfied with 
having to think, they will be satisfied, having thought.  
 
We see how the harness fits—but we do not see fully. 
Naturally, this is to be expected. Science must discover what 
it has been doing, as Jerry Fodor notes, and it only 
retrospectively understands what it has been talking about.xxvi 
In this respect, philosophy is no different. We, thinking with 
Hegel, will see what we can. Our readers, thinking with us, 
will see a little more—maybe more than a little. Together, we 
will constitute the fourth wave. 
 
SPOT ON 
 
Here is an edifying story: Augustin-Jean Fresnel developed a 
wave theory of light. He submitted his theory to the Académie 
des sciences’ 1817 prize competition. Siméon Denis Poisson 
was a member of the prize committee. Poisson was also a 
proponent of the mainstream corpuscular theory of light, and 
so he attempted a reductio ad absurdum of Fresnel’s theory. 
Poisson demonstrated that the theory entails that there is a 
spot of light at the center of a circular shadow. Another judge, 
François Arago, performed experiments that demonstrated 
that there is indeed a spot of light in the heart of darkness.xxvii 
Fresnel was awarded the prize.  
 
This story’s moral is not that darkness is constitutively linked, 
and not merely coupled, to the light at its center. Instead, the 
moral is that intended reductios of a theory can be features 
which the theory’s proponents have not recognized.  
 
Rupert maintains that the suggestion that the sun could be an 
aspect of a cognitive system is a reductio of the extended 
mind: “Anyone who claims that the proper system of study in 
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cognitive science is an organism-star system provides a 
reductio of the extended approach to cognitive science—at 
least if the notion of a cognitive system is meant to admit to 
inference to the location or constitution of a mind (after all, 
no part of my mind is 91 million miles from Earth).”xxviii 
Rupert also claims: 
 
Language does not suddenly appear in the 
world, its content in place. If our subject’s 
mind extends into the world because the 
content of her [sic] thoughts derives from the 
content of the external units that caused the 
development of some of her internal 
resources, then our subject’s mind should also 
extend to encompass the minds of those 
ancestors and the like, the mental states in 
whom are responsible for the current external 
units’ having the content they have. Thus, 
however exactly the dependence-reasoning is 
supposed to proceed, it seems unprincipled to 
include external linguistic resources as part of 
the extended mind, while excluding the minds 
that give rise to the content of those external 
linguistic resources; in both cases—moving 
from current subject to linguistic units and 
from linguistic units to other subjects—
content-dependence is the issue. But to 
include all of these other minds in the 
extended mind is a reductio of the view; 
cognitive science has no use for cognitive 
systems that include the dead and 
decomposed.xxix 
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He further objects to Robert A. Wilson’s views on the 
extended mind because, Rupert claims, they entail 
behaviorism.xxx  
 
Like Fresnel, we reject the reductios but not the findings. 
Rupert’s two reductios of the theory of extended mind are 
actually features that should be vigorously endorsed. They 
further articulate the theory; the sun can indeed be an aspect 
of a distributed cognitive system, so too can the minds of 
ancestors. Moreover, the extended mind entails a species of 
behaviorism. Not only can the extended mind be productively 
extended, it also has the resources to respond to objections. 
 
IT DEPENDS 
 
Rejecting the thesis of the extended mind in general, and the 
suggestion that language could extend the mind in particular, 
Rupert urges that “the persisting nature of the capacities 
investigated by cognitive science cannot be squared with the 
often fleeting nature of extended systems composed of human 
organisms and external linguistic resources,” adding that such 
extended systems “do not have the longevity or integrity to 
support the capacities of interest in cognitive science.”xxxi  
 
Even if Rupert’s claims about mainstream cognitive science’s 
narrow scope of interests were correct, it would not follow 
that those interests might not be augmented and developed, as 
proponents of the extended mind demand.xxxii
xxxiii
 Nor does it 
show that other disciplines—such as anthropology, 
economics, epistemology, ethnography, ethnology, ethology, 
evolutionary biology, organizational science, philosophy of 
mind, philosophy of science, political science, and social 
psychology—share that narrow scope.   
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Rupert rejects what he refers to as “dependence-reasoning: if 
some thought (or mental activity, or cognition) depends on 
factor X in some especially strong or clear way, then X is 
literally part of the thinker’s cognitive system.”xxxiv He claims 
that, “dependence-reasoning is not, in general, a reliable form 
of inference” because “there is simply too much dependence 
in the world for it to ground the individuation of systems, 
cognitive or otherwise.”xxxv  
 
Rupert’s argument against dependence-reasoning 
presupposes that the proper individuation of cognitive 
systems is already known, and that this knowledge can be 
used to determine whether dependence-reasoning has 
provided the correct result. It is this very assumption that is at 
issue, however, and so dependence-reasoning cannot be 
rejected as such. True, dependence reasoning will not ground 
an individuation of cognitive systems in a manner that is 
amenable to what Rupert believes are the current interests of 
mainstream cognitive science. This is why the extended 
mind’s proponents demand that those interests be broadened.  
 
To be sure, there is lots of dependence in the world. 
Nevertheless, biological organisms are active, not passive, 
recipients of the factors on which they depend. Those 
dependencies are reciprocal. Georg Theiner notes, for 
instance, that “proponents of external perception have argued 
that the body’s own morphology and activities (such as eye-
movements, foveation, or head-turning), but also ambient 
environmental structures are equal partners of the brain as part 
of a continuous, boundary-crossing feedback cycle that 
dynamically links perception to action.”xxxvi A socially 
distributed group cognitive system individuated through 
dependence-reasoning will be analogous to Hegel’s concept 
of Geist. Only metaphysical prejudice would consider that a 
reason for rejecting such reasoning.  
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Distributed cognition claims that cognitive systems result 
from persons dynamically interacting with their 
environments.xxxvii Hence, questions about the mind’s 
location are ill-formed, as the cognitive system is the dynamic 
interaction of its constituent parts, and those parts are parts 
only because they collectively constitute the system. This 
results in a deterritorialization, where the mind cannot be 
located in any one of the system’s parts, but rather extends 
through—indeed, is—the system itself.  
 
This converges on Hegel’s concept of Geist, which potentially 
encompasses all of humanity—and all of nature as well, since 
nature is Geist in its nascent state. Geist emerges from nature, 
but Geist continues to depend on nature, and so nature is an 
aspect of Geist. Given their interests, many philosophers are 
not interested in Geist per se, but only with specific aspects of 
it. They focus on those aspects—decomposites—and bracket 
the rest.xxxviii
xxxix
 There is nothing untoward about this, as long as 
it is remembered that these are decomposites of the whole. In 
accepting the extended mind, cognitive science will not lose 
the data collected, as Rupert fears.  However, the full 
meaning(s) of that data will finally result from their placement 
within a larger system of relations. 
 
THAT’S JUST WEIRD 
 
It is relatively easy for persons to recognize their own 
idiosyncratic prejudices. All that is required is that they 
frequently interact with others. Prejudices are more difficult 
to discern when they pervade a culture, or a discipline. 
Persons then need to make a concentrated effort, through 
reading or traveling, to encounter persons having different 
values, cultures, traditions, genders, and ethnicities. Appeals 
to commonsense, intuition, or “our” views refer, not to those 
of all persons, but to those in Western, Educated, 
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Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies.xl 
Joseph Henrich et al. show that WEIRD persons are 
frequently statistical outliers when compared to those who are 
not WEIRD. One of the characteristics of WEIRD persons is 
their individualism. According to this individualism, the 
minds of persons, and their selves, do not expand beyond their 
skins. Interactions with and relations to other people and to 
the environment are not regarded as constitutive of identity.  
 
Outside of WEIRD societies, though, many people 
experience their kin as their self. Julian Pitt-Rivers notes that 
“the majority of the world’s peoples do not share the 
individualism of the modern West and have no need to explain 
what appears to them evident: the self is not the individual self 
alone, but includes, according to circumstances, those with 
whom the self is conceived as solidary, in the first place, his 
[sic] kin.”xli Maurice Bloch corroborates this: 
 
Many African and Asian peoples say that the 
members of a descent group share the same 
bones. To say this is not to use a metaphor for 
closeness; it means exactly what it says in that 
these people believe that the bones of their 
body are part of a greater undifferentiated 
totality. In cases such as these the body is not 
experienced as finally bounded by the air 
around it; it is also continuous with the parts 
of the bodies of people who in modern western 
ideology could be seen as ‘others’.... What 
such bodyness implies is that what happens to 
other members of your household is, to a 
certain extent, also happening to you 
irrespective of whether these others are 
women or men. Because of this the radical 
disjunction between different people is far 
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from absolute in such societies.... Individuals 
may interconnect much more than the 
ideology of individualism leads us to 
believe.... In these cases the boundary between 
the experience of Ego and Alter is far from 
absolute.xlii 
 
While many WEIRD philosophers assert that the mind and 
the self cannot extend beyond the skin, the individualistic 
intuitions that would support this are parochial.xliii  
 
Wilson, a proponent of the extended mind, endorses an 
individualistic view of subjectivity. Wilson maintains that 
“wide computational systems thus involve minds that literally 
extend beyond the confines of the skull into the world.xliv 
However, he rejects the suggestion that the extended mind 
could result in “wide subjects” who would have mental states: 
 
There may, of course, be interesting science 
fiction or other fanciful examples that pull our 
intuitions toward such radical conclusions, but 
it is important not to lose sight of the fact that, 
at least in the world that we actually inhabit, 
and being the creatures that we actually are, 
there is a basis for marking out individuals as 
the subjects of properties, even those 
properties with wide realizations. 
Individuals—and here, as always, our 
paradigms are individual people and 
individual organisms—are spatio-temporally 
bounded, relatively cohesive, unified entities 
that are continuous across space and time.... In 
the actual world, it is individuals who form 
and maintain beliefs, experience emotions, 
and wonder about what will happen next.xlv 
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Pitt-Rivers and Bloch would argue that Wilson’s view of the 
actual world is WEIRD. The persons in the cultures they 
discuss would not identify the individual with the biological 
organism (and they would differ on the boundaries of the 
biological organism). It may be that WEIRD persons are 
narrow subjects, but it is likely that many non-WEIRD 
persons experience and understand themselves as wide 
subjects.  
 
This is also relevant when considering John Preston’s 
objection to the position of Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers 
that information is a belief because of the functional role it 
plays, and a belief can play that role outside of the body. 
“When it comes to belief,” Clark and Chalmers write, “there 
is nothing sacred about the skull and skin.” To the criticism 
that this sense of “belief” departs from standard usage, they 
reply that “we do not intend to debate what is standard usage; 
our broader point is that the notion of belief ought to be used 
so that Otto qualifies as having the belief in question.”xlvi 
Preston objects: 
 
If one can violate the constraints which 
currently govern concepts like belief and 
mind, beliefs and minds might turn out to be 
unrecognizable to those who use those terms 
correctly in nontechnical contexts. This is 
entirely acceptable when forging a technical 
scientific concept to be used in constructing 
scientific explanations. There, how the term is 
used in nontechnical contexts (if indeed it has 
such a use) shouldn’t constrain what scientists 
want to mean by it. But when dealing with a 
commonsense, everyday concept that figures 
centrally in what cognitive science has to 
explain, it has to be inadvisable. To retain the 
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connection between cognition and everyday 
psychological abilities and achievements as 
pretheoretically conceived is essential, 
because among the ultimate explananda of 
cognitive science are phenomena picked out 
by perfectly ordinary cognitive concepts like 
belief, knowledge, memory, perception, and 
so on.xlvii 
 
That’s just WEIRD! That is, in referring to “nontechnical 
contexts,” “a commonsense, everyday concept,” “everyday 
psychological abilities and achievements as pretheoretically 
conceived,” and “perfectly ordinary cognitive concepts,” 
Preston presupposes WEIRD understandings of these 
concepts, abilities, and achievements. The individualistic 
intuitions that underlie those understandings are not shared by 
most people. Cognitive science can be legitimately criticized, 
moreover, insofar as it assumes that the concepts, abilities, 
and achievements it seeks to explain are universal, instead of 
recognizing how WEIRD they are.  
 
Preston might respond by defending the individualistic 
intuitions, urging that they should be endorsed, even though 
they originate in WEIRD societies. In making such a move, 
though, he would be agreeing with Clark and Chalmers that 
what is crucial is how such concepts as belief ought to be used.  
 
To repeat: individualism is not shared by most people. 
WEIRD philosophers begin with the individual’s non-
extended mind and then extend it beyond the skin. For many 
others who are not WEIRD, as well as WEIRD proponents of 
socially distributed group cognition, the mind is always 
already extended. What WEIRD philosophers regard as a 
non-extended mind is the distorting result of prescinding from 
persons’ social and natural environments.  
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James Hollan et al. and Shaun Gallagher recognize that 
constitutive coupling in one way precludes such coupling in 
other ways.xlviii Moreover, one way may make the possibility 
of other ways invisible. Edwin Hutchins says that “the most 
direct way to render something invisible is to refrain from 
mentioning it.”xlix Occasionally, those who are not 
mentioning something are fully aware of it, but are hoping 
that others will not notice it. Creative bookkeeping generally 
works this way. Usually, however, the thing has also become 
invisible to those who are not mentioning it. Even if it is 
visible in the sense that persons are aware of its existence, its 
salience and relevance are not recognized and so it functions 
as though it were invisible.  
 
Socially distributed group cognition needs to expand the 
group over which cognition is socially distributed. And the 
expansion should increase not only the size of the group, but 
also the range of diversity of its members. Here, a compelling 
case can be made for comparative philosophy. For example, 
discussions of personal identity will be limited if the 
arguments supporting the claim that Śiva is the true self of 
each person—as maintained by his devotees in Kashmir 
during the 9th-12th centuries—cannot be considered. This 
expansion is unlikely to result in a unified group, but instead 
in a continuing conversation, characterized by moments of 
consensus that are an archipelago in a sea of dissensus, 
disagreement, and squabbling. In this way, being blinkered 
can be a point of departure, something to be transcended, and 
not a destiny. 
 
 
WIDE SUBJECTS: GROUPS 
 
Wilson’s view that only individuals, not wide subjects, can 
have mental states is WEIRD. Groups—to refer to wide 
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subjects by their familiar name—can have mental states.l 
Groups are real. They can be neither eliminated nor reduced 
to their individual members.li Raimo Tuomela discusses “we-
intentions,” where each member of a group (1) intends to act, 
(2) believes that the other members intend to act, and (3) 
believes that (1) and (2) hold for every other member of the 
group.lii Pace Tuomela, there can be group intentions where 
(1) and (2) do not obtain. More generally, a group can have a 
mental state that none of its members has.  
 
A limitation of much recent work on groups is that the 
exemplars have been corporations and associations where, it 
is implicitly assumed, their members share common purposes. 
“In treating collectives,” Frederick F. Schmitt writes, “I will 
follow other writers in taking the social group as the paradigm 
of a collectivity. By a ‘social group’ here I mean, roughly, a 
collectivity capable of action in the manner of a corporation 
or association.”liii This approach virtually guarantees that 
groups will be conceptualized as organizations whose 
members voluntarily intend to join. In arguing for the 
possibility of collective attitudes, for example, Margaret 
Gilbert believes that a group’s members make a joint 
commitment, expressing their willingness to be jointly 
committed as a group.liv  
 
In addition to corporations and associations, prisoners, 
students, soldiers, and immigrants are also groups. Enlarging 
the scope of the groups beyond those of corporations and 
associations, makes apparent that groups are frequently 
internally conflicted, both about their purposes as well as the 
ways in which those purposes should be pursued. Following 
Michel Foucault, it could be argued that conflict is inherent to 
groups, but it is sufficient to note that conflict is frequent.lv 
Rather than viewing conflict as the breakdown of socially 
distributed group cognition, it is more productive to see 
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conflict as a mode of such cognition. Having a shared purpose 
is not an either/or, for example, but rather a continuum.lvi One 
endpoint of this continuum would be civil war. Even here, one 
could interpret this, not as the group’s disintegration, but 
rather as the continuation of its politics by other means. There 
are civil wars where the factions are determined to terminate 
the group, and each now fights for possession of resources. In 
other cases, though, factions fight to determine the group’s 
character.lvii  
 
That discussions of class struggle are not prominent in the 
recent literature on groups has been, at least in part, a result of 
the sort of groups investigated. Corporations have served as a 
primary instance of groups, as noted above, but the focus has 
been on the relations among persons in upper-management. 
There has been little attention paid to the relations between 
shareholders, chief executive officers, upper-managers, 
middle-managers, non-salaried workers (full-time and part-
time), and the public. After belt-tightening, for example, some 
belts are tighter than others; some got to tighten (or loosen) 
their own belts, some had their belts tightened by others. 
Expanding that focus would make visible that cooperation 
and consensus are usually temporary moments in a group’s 
life, seldom defining characteristics, suggesting that the 
mental states of a group are frequently conflicted. It would 
also show the ways in which individuals are constituted by 
their memberships in groups, how groups are in turn 
constituted by their members, as well as how both individuals 
and groups resist the ways in which they are constituted.  
 
“The True is the whole,” Hegel writes.lviii The whole is 
constituted through its parts, however, and those parts have a 
relative autonomy. This is most apparent in Hegel’s political 
philosophy.lix There, individuals have rights which the state 
cannot infringe. The proper analysis of groups must be 
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binocular, recognizing that a collective and its individual 
members are mutually co-determining and co-constituting. 
This is the reason, moreover, that the concept of 
supervenience is not apt in this context; adapting 
supervenience for use here would require that groups 
supervene on individuals and that individuals also supervene 
on groups. 
 
LEARNING WITH HEGEL 
 
All we really need to know about the extended mind—to 
improvise on the title of Robert Fulghum’s All I Really Need 
to Know I Learned in Kindergarten—we can learn with 
Hegel.lx Just as we only discover in later years what lessons 
we learned in kindergarten, however, so we only learn to 
properly read Hegel by engaging the contemporary literature.  
 
Tyler Burge recognizes that Hegel is a mental content 
externalist.lxi Similarly, Hegel offers an account of group 
cognition. Not only is he a precursor, however, his account 
represents a substantial advance beyond the extended mind’s 
first two waves. First, they regard non-extended individual 
cognition as basic and normal. They begin with and 
presuppose non-extended cognition, and then reach extended 
cognition by adding features to non-extended cognition. It 
might be thought that this is mainly a consequence of the 
demands of presentation; pedagogically, it is clearest to begin 
with non-extended individual cognition and to extend from 
there. The hesitancy (perhaps timidity) with which the move 
from the non-extended mind to the extended mind has been 
made suggests otherwise. Hegel also begins his elucidations, 
in his Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of Spirit, with 
the individual. However, the individual is quickly sublated—
canceled, transcended, and preserved. Hegel recognizes that 
the individual and group are mutually co-determining, and so 
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he can offer an account of the emergence of socially 
distributed group cognition, one that encompasses, 
potentially, all of humanity.  
 
Second, Hegel does not regard cognition as requiring 
phenomenal consciousness. Rather, cognition is behavioral 
(actual) and public. As a result, he can offer an account of 
socially distributed group cognition, while remaining neutral 
and indifferent to whether there is phenomenal consciousness 
(qualia), and so he can remain neutral and indifferent to 
whether either there can be extended phenomenal 
consciousness, or whether a group can have phenomenal 
consciousness.  
 
If the individual and the collective, as well as individual and 
group cognition, are mutually co-determining, then would 
approaches that begin with either be equally valid? In 
principle, yes. In practice, however, almost never. Thought 
does not begin from nowhere. Rather, it always occurs within 
a specific historical and ideological conjuncture. The 
conjuncture that is WEIRD privileges the individual to such 
an extent that collectives and groups are often regarded as 
solely aggregates of individuals. It is not impossible to begin 
with individual non-extended cognition, move from there to 
extended cognition, then to group cognition, and finally 
articulate the proper identity of difference and identity of their 
mutual co-determination. This is Hegel’s procedure, after all.  
 
Nevertheless, although this is not impossible, it is exceedingly 
difficult. Given the individualism of WEIRD societies, the 
risk is that the one-sided emphasis on individual non-extended 
cognition will not be sublated—it will be regarded as actual 
rather than as an expository device—and so it will infect the 
entire analysis in ways that remain unrecognized. In light of 
this, the best way is to begin with group cognition, move from 
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there to extended cognition, and then to individual non-
extended cognition. This has risks too, of course, but they are 
substantially less than the alternative approach. In this way, 
the whole truth emerges, that the result—socially distributed 
group cognition—is also the beginning.  
 
Epistemologically, in the order of explication, group 
cognition is prior. Although there could not be groups without 
individuals, individuals can only be individuals (persons) 
through their constitutive group memberships. Young 
children participate in group cognition before developing 
individual cognition, arguably, and they develop the latter 
because they already participate in the former.lxii  
 
Ontologically, in the order of being, group cognition is also 
prior. Even though group cognition and individual cognition 
are mutually co-determining, it does not follow that the co-
determinations are of equal strength or importance. In 
WEIRD societies, it is best to emphasize group cognition even 
if, sub specie aeternitatis—more accurately, sub specie 
durationis—that is a one-sided and distorted overemphasis. 
 
QUESTIONING AUTHORITY, THE (CHASTISED) 
BEHAVIORISTS RETURN 
 
Preston maintains that individuals have a privileged first-
person authority about their mental states: 
 
Belief is (along with meaning, intention, 
suspicion, supposition, expectation, hope, and 
apprehension) one of the mental phenomena 
about which we have first-person authority in 
utterance. One has a sort of cognitively 
primitive authority over what it is one thinks, 
means, intends, expects, and so on. When it 
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comes to belief, this is the fact that, for the 
heart of each person’s belief system, the 
massive central core of one’s thinking that so-
and-so is the case, one just can say, with 
authority, what it is one thinks or believes in a 
way that brooks no contradiction by others (or 
even by oneself at a later date).lxiii 
 
This first-person authority—and, presumably, access—often 
does not obtain, at least when the beliefs in question are of 
any consequence, suggesting that the mental states of 
individuals are no less conflicted than those of groups. To put 
the point paradoxically, individuals often do not believe what 
they (with first-person authority, assert that they) believe. The 
numerous studies of so-called implicit bias corroborate this. 
Preston would likely respond that such biases involve 
unconscious beliefs, and so lack first-person authority. The 
problem remains. First-person authority can be undermined 
by the undermind. When an individual asserts first-person 
authority in utterance, that authority may nonetheless be 
overthrown because there are unconscious beliefs which, in 
practice, are the reasons for the individual’s actions. Insofar 
as unconscious beliefs trump asserted beliefs, there is no first-
person authority.lxiv  
 
First-person authority is not inherent, it is conferred. It is 
because others grant this authority that it obtains. Articulating 
the consequence of content externalism, Hilary Putnam 
maintained that “cut the pie any way you like, ‘meaning’ just 
ain’t in the head!”lxv John McDowell saw that, as a further 
consequence, “the mind—the locus of our manipulations of 
meanings—is not in the head either.”lxvi The mind is not in 
the head, it is publicly accessible. What individuals, or groups, 
believe is apparent to others, even when those individuals or 
groups believe that they believe something other than they do 
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believe. Their beliefs are apparent in all of the usual ways, 
from what they say, what they write, what they do, how they 
act, how they respond. There is no mystery in this. Persons 
read the minds of others, and often better than they read their 
own minds.  
 
Collective intentionality needs to be refigured so that 
reference is made, not to an individual’s private mental states, 
but instead to behavior, public expressions. There is no need 
to quarrel with the requirement that actions, unlike mere 
behaviors, must be intentional. Intentions are imputed by 
others, however, not pre-existent. This means that whether an 
event is an action will have been the result of the assessment 
of others.  
 
Hegel can help explicate this. He has sufficient affinities with 
behaviorism that Michael Forster claims that he is a 
behaviorist, as well as a physicalist and an eliminative 
materialist.lxvii
lxviii
 Hegel’s position is more subtle than these 
suggest. Robert B. Pippin recognizes that “Hegel argues that 
our conventional modern understanding of agency makes a 
distorting error by clumsily ‘separating’ the inner intention 
from the outer manifestation of the inner, and also in trying to 
explain the action by reference to the isolated separate 
intention as prior cause.... We cannot determine what actually 
was a subject’s intention or motivating reason by relying on 
some sort of introspection, by somehow looking more deeply 
into the agent’s soul, or by some sincerity test.... Only as 
manifested or expressed can one (even the subject herself) 
retrospectively determine what must have been intended.”  
Intentions are not internal mental states, for Hegel; rather, 
they are externalized mental states, expressed in and 
constituted through actions. Mental content is not located in 
an interiority that is directly accessible only by the person. 
Instead, mental content is located in the external world, in its 
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expression, and is often more accessible to others than to the 
person. The actual intentions cannot be known by others until 
they are publicly expressed, to be sure, but a person’s 
intentions may be opaque to the person. Persons may 
sincerely report that they do not have sexist or racist beliefs, 
based on first-person introspection.lxix However, their words 
and deeds may prove that they actually do have such beliefs. 
Hence, persons may not believe what (they believe that) they 
believe.  
 
More radically, the intentions of a person or group are 
constituted by what the entity actually does. Intentions 
become ontologically determinate only through their public 
expression. What that public expression is, what it means, is 
what other people take it to be and mean. There is an element 
of fallibility here, as what people initially take it to mean may 
be subsequently revised by others.  
 
And so, after a long exile, chastised for their many excesses, 
the behaviorists return. Mental states—although “state” is 
precisely the wrong word for these dynamic processes—are 
public, available for inspection, if not introspection. What 
persons, and groups, think, believe, fear, and hope is apparent 
to others, if not to themselves. The mental should be 
understood as public and behavioral (or actual), rather than as 
neurophysiological or as phenomenally conscious (qualia). 
On this view, phenomenal consciousness has little to do with 
the mental.  
 
It has taken several centuries to displace the ego from the 
exalted place Descartes assigned it. Having finally dislodged 
it, after so many successive pushes, the temptation is almost 
irresistible to install something else there in its place. 
Nevertheless, this temptation must be resisted.  
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Socially distributed group cognition is likely counter-
intuitive—if the intuitions are WEIRD. From the perspective 
of intuitions that are not WEIRD, it is highly intuitive. What 
is counter-intuitive is the suggestion that the mind could be 
non-extendedly located in an individual, perhaps creeping 
out, every now and then, when a checkbook needs to be 
balanced or taxes are due. Just as the mind has extended, so 
the self has expanded, always already—as socially distributed 
group cognitive systems, as wide subjects. Both are 
deterritorialized. Socially distributed group cognition can be 
directly furthered by travel to places that are not WEIRD, of 
course, but also by reading anthropology, history, non-
Western philosophy, and so forth. 
 
I is someone else. We is too.lxx 
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